Obama’s Confused, Pragmatic Policy on Libya

The Washington Post published an editorial Saturday, April 16, “The Libya Stalemate,” lamenting President Obama’s hesitation to increase the U.S. role in Libya.  They also do not appreciate the President leaving our NATO allies, specifically Britain and France, high and dry when we have the military capabilities to do whatever it is they want us to help them do.

According to The Post, only the unique capabilities of the U.S. military can tip the balance in favor of the rebels or at least effectively protect civilians and enforce the UN resolution.  But The Post concludes Mr. Obama is stubborn . . .
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On Libya and Blowback

Updated Below

Over at the National Interest, Paul Pillar raises one of the issues with America’s current intervention in Libya that has not been discussed nearly enough:  the effect on terrorism.  When terrorism has been brought up in the context of Libya it is usually framed around Qaddafi’s past support for it—particularly the 1988 bombing Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland—and the possibility that he will return to supporting terrorism in the wake of the West’s attempt to depose him.  There is also the loss of Libyan cooperation in the War on Terror that came after Qaddafi traded the . . .
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Libya, No-Fly Zones, and U.S. Intervention

The conflict in Libya continues to unfold, evolving day by day. Although the situation is fluid and unpredictable, the chorus of voices calling for the U.S. and Europe to intervene grow louder by the day. Indeed, the United States and United Kingdom are seriously contemplating implementation of a no-fly zone. Hans-Inge Langø provided an intelligent look at implementing a no-fly zone last week through the lens of the responsibility to protect doctrine. David Cloud of the Los Angeles Times provides a further examination of the logistics involved in implementing a no-fly zone. The narrative in popular commentary: a no-fly zone over Libya is possible, but very complex, and the efficacy is questionable. . . .
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